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Abstract: Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five 
years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why 
it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated either in terms of a Don’t Kill rule or a Death 
Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a 
prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral 
core of the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR 
was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices with 
ethics, unlike today’s critics of the DDR who “rethink” ethics in a question-begging fashion to 
accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the 
debate forward.  
 
Introduction 
In the past twenty-five years, much work has been published on the so-called “dead-donor” rule 
(DDR) and the alleged problems it poses for organ transplantation. Most of this literature is 
critical of the rule and calls for its abandonment, yet the rule’s exact formulation is not always 
clear and the reasons for abandoning it are not always sound. Indeed, as I argue in the first 
section of this paper, there are two distinct ways of formulating the rule, both of which lend 
themselves to distinct ways of justifying their application. On the one hand, the DDR is 
interpreted as a requirement that the donor be dead before surgery begins, a rule that appears to 
form a prudential policy essential for securing the trust of potential donors in the transplant 
enterprise. On the other hand, it is interpreted as a norm against intentionally killing the innocent 
via transplant surgery, a norm that is historically rooted in the absolutist ethical systems of 
Kantian deontology, natural law theory, and religious ideas embedded in Judaism and 
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Christianity—not in principles of utility.1 Hence, it is insufficient to argue from the premise that 
the DDR has negative effects on donor trust (assuming this is the case) to the conclusion that it 
should be rejected (e.g. [2]), since the validity of the norm against killing individuals for their 
organs need not depend on whether the killing produces good consequences. As a deontological 
constraint, the DDR forbids lethal transplant surgery as a type of action—and this, as I defend in 
the second section, is the moral core of the DDR. While the theoretical limits of this constraint 
are hotly debated today, it was originally received as an absolute ban on lethal surgery. As shown 
in the third section, the early transplanters of the 1950s and ’60s had good reasons for 
understanding the rule this way, and they labored to make their practices conform with the law 
and long-standing ethical principles concerning the ethics of killing. Today, however, we see 
something of a reversal of this pattern of thought; critics are eager to “rethink” the ethics of 
killing and laws against homicide to permit lethal practices they assume to be acceptable. In the 
fourth section, I take issue with this assumption because the question is begged against the 
traditional reasons that the DDR was adopted for in the first place. Since our medical practices 
should conform with sound ethical principles no matter how much we may desire for them to be 
acceptable, I end by calling for the continuation of a more thorough and consistent discussion of 
the reasons why we should reject the norm against killing the innocent in general and why it 
should be permissible for doctors to kill for organs in particular. While this may be well-worn 
territory, it is “the only game in town” for moving the debate forward. Let us now examine this 
case in greater detail. 
                                                
1 Lest there be any confusion, the kind of “absolutism” I have in mind is the kind G.E.M. Anscombe described when 
she spoke of there being “certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten” and “simply in virtue of their 
description as such-and-such identifiable kinds of action…” [1, p. 10] (emphasis original). 
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What does the rule prohibit? 
Careful thinking about the DDR requires a clear formulation of its content. Surprisingly, this step 
is often glossed over. A sample of the literature reveals two different ways in which the DDR is 
formulated, one I call the “Death Requirement” and the other I call the “Don’t Kill” rule:  
Death Requirement Don’t Kill  
1.    “It is thought permissible to 
retrieve vital organs only from 
dead patients.” [3] 
2.    “A patient should be dead before 
vital organs were removed.” [4, p. 
249] 
3.   “The donor must be dead before 
vital organs are procured.” [5, p. 
670] 
4.   “Multiple vital organs should only 
be taken from dead patients.” [6, p. 
236] 
1.   “It is immoral to kill patients by 
taking their organs.” [7, p. 1] 
2.   The DDR “requires that donors 
not be killed in order to obtain 
their organs.” [8, p. 6] 
3.   “Individuals must not be killed by 
organ retrieval.” [9, p. 36] 
4.   “The DDR states that organ 
donation must not kill the donor; 
thus, the donor must first be 
declared dead.” [10, p. 1289] 
 
As stated, the Don’t Kill rule is less demanding than the Death Requirement because it permits 
vital organ procurement in cases where surgery is causally unrelated to death, where the Death 
Requirement does not. While commonsense suggests that removing a vital organ like the heart 
would cause the death of the donor, this is not necessarily the case in practice. Astonishingly, the 
heart can be removed without killing the donor in what is called a “domino donation.” In this 
protocol, a donor with a healthy heart but diseased lungs can donate her heart to someone else, 
and receive a healthy heart and lungs en bloc from a dead donor.2 To be sure, those who deploy 
the Death Requirement in their writings would probably deem this practice as acceptable and 
admit that the Death Requirement, as stated, is imprecise.3 Critics of the rule have a point, then, 
                                                
2 Robert Sade, e-mail message to author, October 26, 2015. 
3 Or, as an anonymous reviewer suggests, they might even consider the particular organs harvested in this 
specialized context as technically “non-vital.” 
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when they say that the ethically relevant question is not “When is the donor dead?” but rather 
“When is it permissible to remove vital organs from the donor?” [4]. However, death is still an 
important part of answering this question if the donor’s death is not to be intended [11]. 
 The Don’t Kill rule, by contrast, says that it is impermissible to remove vital organs from 
the donor if the donor would be killed by their removal, since the donor’s death should not be 
intended for the sake of retrieving organs.4 Some critics and defenders of the rule agree that this 
is its morally relevant formulation, being a species of the more general norm against harming 
patients.5 Critics of the rule, like Franklin Miller and Robert Truog, recognize that “it is based on 
the seemingly unassailable principle that it is wrong to kill (or cause the death) of an innocent 
person to save the life of another” [3, p. 38]. Moreover, as George Khushf, a defender of the rule, 
explains, the rule “excludes organ-harvesting practices that bring about mortality” [12, p. 256, n. 
1], or put another way, “no person can be killed in order to harvest organs” [12, p. 331]. 
Therefore, the ill-named ‘dead-donor rule’ should be interpreted primarily as a reference to the 
norm against killing donors for their organs, and not primarily as a proscription against the 
removal of vital organs from living patients, as commonsensical as that might be.6  
 What, then, explains the prominence of the Death Requirement? Although the Don’t Kill 
rule is the essential moral core of the DDR, one might think that the Death Requirment is the 
                                                
4 One should not interpret the DDR so narrowly as to think that it only forbids killing by removing organs, but not 
killing for obtaining organs (pace Christian Coons and Noah Levin [6]). The fact that one could consent to be killed 
by the surgical removal of organs but not for the sake of their removal is simply irrelevant in the context of organ 
donation, the context to which the DDR applies (such a person is not a “donor” at all). In that context, no donor is 
indifferent to the good of having one’s organs harvested for the sake of helping others, and no transplant team is 
indifferent to the good of harvesting healthy organs for transplant. 
5 This would also rule out procurement procedures that would leave individuals in a diminished state, even if they 
were not killed.  
6 Levin is one of the few writers on this topic who notes the difference between the Death Requirement and the 
Don’t Kill rule, but he thinks that the Death Requirement is the “historically accurate” formulation despite 
conceding that “the origins of the DDR are unclear” [13, p. 2–3]. Both of these claims I contest below.  
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best policy to adopt to avoid risking abuse and to secure donor trust. Obviously, transplant 
surgery is less controversial when the donor is dead. Technically, however, the Don’t Kill rule 
allows vital organs to be procured so long as the donor is not killed by the procedure, and these 
surgeries are much more controversial. For example, under Paul Morrissey’s proposal, a surgeon 
may remove both kidneys from someone who is irreversibly brain-damaged but does not satisfy 
neurological criteria for death [14]. Under this protocol, a designated proxy authorizes the 
removal of the kidneys before life support is removed; once the kidneys are retrieved, life 
support is withdrawn, and the donor dies of respiratory complications. Assuming the cause of 
death is related to the fatal brain trauma and not to the absence of kidney functioning, the Don’t 
Kill rule is not violated.7 Crucial to this proposal are the certainty of the diagnosis of imminent 
death and the substantial cause of death.8 This is a demanding standard, and any errors in 
diagnoses would be catastrophic for the patient, while implicating the surgeon in the donor’s 
death. Even if the diagnosis is correct, doctors must still consider the risk of the surgery’s being 
the proximate cause of death.9 To avoid any risk of violating the Don’t Kill rule, then, the best 
                                                
7 Some contend that the Don’t Kill rule is violated because withdrawing life support is what “causes death” not the 
underlying pathology [15, p. 2]. While this requires fuller treatment, my quick reply is that framing human action in 
terms of its causal activity or inactivity is a poor way to understand human action. Does a boy scout “cause the 
death” of his breathless and unconscious scout master (imagine some accident out on the trail) when he ceases to 
perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation after an hour? The fact that the scout master could have lived longer had the 
scout not given up is not sufficient for helping us understand what the scout does—certainly he does not kill him. It 
seems that there is at least a morally relevant distinction between being a cause of death (which may affect the 
timing of it) and being the cause of death (which is the source of the fatal sequence) [16]. This is not to say that 
someone’s death cannot be intended by withdrawing life support, but doing so does not require such an intention. 
For further treatment on this topic see Jensen [17]. 
8 This is also the source of the controversy over so-called “donation-after-circulatory-death” protocols.  
9 According to critics of Paul Morrisey’s proposal:  
Midline laparotomy and bilateral nephrectomy [the procedures that remove both kidneys] after the original brain 
injury is an additional iatrogenic (penetrating and blunt) trauma resulting in extracranial tissue injuries and 
potentially hastening or causing death. Surgery can induce post-operative cardiovascular instability secondary to 
blood loss, intraoperative fluid shifts, and intravascular hypovolemia. In the absence of optimal perioperative 
resuscitation, the final common pathway is an early onset of hypotension and cardiovascular collapse. The latter 
becomes the lethal pathophysiology and proximate cause of death upon WLS [withdrawing life support]. [18, p. 18] 
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policy is to satisfy the Death Requirement, a standard Morrissey’s proposal does not meet. Thus, 
a precautionary approach that avoids contravening the Don’t Kill rule gives the Death 
Requirement its normativity. The normativity of the Death Requirement may also be reinforced 
with the belief that it best protects the patient’s end-of-life care from being compromised and, 
therefore, better secures donor trust in the transplant system. For these reasons, the stronger 
Death Requirement might be preferable to the weaker Don’t Kill rule, which would help explain 
its prominence.10 Yet if the risk of violating the Don’t Kill rule were shown to be tolerable, and 
the patient’s end-of-life care were able to be safeguarded, Morrissey’s proposal would be 
permissible insofar as the Don’t Kill rule is concerned. What is at stake is the suitability of 
certain protocols that do not meet the more risk averse Death Requirement: are they safe enough 
to practice, or would we risk killing the donor? How Morrissey’s proposal is adjudicated will 
depend not only on the answer to this question but also on the interpretation of the rule favored 
as a matter of policy. What is important to understand for our purposes is that the moral core of 
the DDR is the Don’t Kill rule, and the Death Requirement is the operational result of a 
precautionary approach to complying with it. This type of framing has important implications for 
understanding the DDR’s purpose.  
What is the rule’s purpose? 
The DDR is commonly recognized to be a deontological constraint on our efforts to maximize 
the number of transplantable organs, but the meaning of this notion is unclear. In a broad sense, 
                                                
10 This sort of thinking is captured well in DeVita and Snyder’s description of four cases in which donation-after-
circulatory-death protocols were used [19]. They report that, in the effort to standardize these protocols, some 
transplant teams and procurement officials were concerned “that an overly liberal policy might result in a public 
outcry that would jeopardize the future of organ donation” [19, p. 136]. I take what they mean by an “overly liberal 
policy” to include removing vital organs from donors who have satisfied neither neurological nor circulatory 
criteria. 
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it means that, regardless of the consequences, we must not instrumentalize donors to such an 
extent that they can be killed for their organs. Yet the limits of this constraint are up for debate. 
Can donors be killed for their organs if they give valid consent? Or would such cases be ruled 
out because they involve killing the innocent?11 The answer depends on which form of 
deontology is at work. If the broadly Rossian variety found in Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress’ widely read Principles of Biomedical Ethics is at work [20], then exceptions to the 
Don’t Kill rule can be plausibly formulated through the mechanism of voluntary informed 
consent. However, if the absolutist variety deriving from Kant’s ethical system, natural law 
theory, or Judeo-Christian morality is at work, then no exceptions can be made—the Don’t Kill 
rule is simply meant to forbid this type of action. Rather than settle this philosophical debate 
here, I will just say that the historical understanding of the DDR in the 1960s favored the 
absolutist sort (see below for details). The particular reasons for this leaning depend on the 
tradition assumed, but a respect for the inviolateness of innocent human life is the underlying 
concern. Interestingly, some critics of the ban recognize that its character signifies society’s 
respect for human life [21], while some of its defenders pass over this issue entirely and 
emphasize its utility, claiming that compliance is essential for securing the trust of willing 
would-be donors [22]. It is thought that donor trust would be curtailed if the rule were routinely 
violated [10]. These two trains of thought are often blended together in ways that make the 
purposes of the rule reducible to respecting persons and avoiding harm (e.g. [22]). As today’s 
bioethicists tend to work out their policies in terms of a quasi-rule utilitarianism where principles 
                                                
11 There is a question about the “non-innocent”—people on death row—which I leave aside, since such a practice 
depends on the validity of the death penalty, an issue that needs to be resolved before any “death-by-transplant-
surgery” proposal can be evaluated.  
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of respect are “balanced off” with principles of beneficence (e.g. [23]),12 the purpose of the DDR 
is thought to be twofold: (1) to protect the interests of the donor, and (2) to secure the goods 
necessary to further the goals of transplantation. This more pragmatic interpretation of the rule 
explains why some people think the DDR “never really has been a rule, but rather a guideline” 
[4, p. 252]. This, however, is an impoverished view of the rule’s purpose. To see why, I shall 
examine two flawed criticisms of the rule, which depend on these assumptions.  
Not about successful mediation 
Critics of the DDR typically contend that the rule should be rejected if it is at odds with the 
respect for persons or if it fails to secure the trust it promises [2, 7, 9, 25, 26]. This is an instance 
of a more general strategy, which argues against the rationality of accepting an absolute 
prohibition from the premise that perfect compliance with it frustrates the purposes of the 
prohibition [27]. Perhaps the best example of this critical framework comes from Elysa 
Koppelman, who thinks the DDR ought to be discarded because it can no longer “successfully 
mediate” the utilitarian goal of maximizing the organ supply with the deontological value of 
respecting the wishes of donors who are irreversibly unconscious [7, p. 2]. Successful mediation 
of these goals is what she believes characterizes the concerns of the transplant community. While 
she formulates the DDR in terms of the Don’t Kill rule, she believes that compliance requires a 
precise definition of death when the surgery for successful transplant would otherwise kill the 
donor. Since there is a lack of consensus on the definition of death, she concludes that the DDR 
cannot “mediate the concerns of the organ transplant community,” and if we assume that 
                                                
12 Albert Jonsen is worth quoting: “To be more precise […], the ‘rule utilitarianism’ that combines respect for rule 
and principle with the the goals of human and social thriving is the dominant ethos of bioethics at the level of public 
policy”[23, p. 44].  
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respecting persons and killing them are incompatible, “we risk compromising the utilitarian 
goal” [5, p. 5]. To achieve a more optimal balance between the utility of maximizing the organ 
supply and the deontological value of respecting those who supply them, we ought to permit 
donors to negotiate their deaths with their transplant surgeons.  
 There are two problems with this argument. First, it is doubtful that the purpose of the 
DDR is to “successfully mediate” the delicate balance between the good of maximizing the 
organ supply and the good of respecting the organ suppliers. Instead, the DDR is meant to 
conflict with the utilitarian goal—it is not meant to identify a neutral space of moral ground 
where the principles of beneficence and respect for persons can meet.14 The rule is merely meant 
to forbid a certain kind of action from being performed on the donor’s body. Second, there is no 
good reason why a lack of consensus on a topic is sufficient to reject rules that involve the topic. 
Koppelman’s argument seems to be this:  
1.   The DDR requires a precise definition of death.  
2.   There is no consensus on the definition of death.  
3.   Therefore, the DDR ought to be rejected.  
 
I shall call this the No Consensus argument. Its general form goes like this: 
1.   Rule R concerning Q requires that there be a precise definition of Q.  
2.   There is no consensus concerning the precise definition of Q.  
3.   Therefore, R should be rejected.  
 
Is her application of this argument sound? I think not. Consider this argument:  
1.   Rules that protect the free exercise of religion require a precise definition of “religion.”  
2.   There is no consensus on the definition of “religion.” 
3.   Therefore, rules that protect the free exercise of religion ought to be rejected.  
 
                                                
14 I take her language about “utilitarian” and “deontological” values to be indicative of a conflict between the 
standard bioethical principles of beneficence and respect for persons, not utilitarian or deontological ethics in a 
theoretical sense.  
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Yet we have good reason to accept rules that protect the freedom of religion despite the fact that 
there is no consensus on the definition of religion [28]. Some of those reasons involve the 
principles of beneficence and respect for persons, or other principles upon which any just society 
is based [29]. The same is true of rules protecting ideals like free speech or the freedom to marry, 
or rules making use of disputed concepts like race or gender. Yet the No Consensus argument 
would have us believe that any term’s lack of consensus definition is grounds for rejecting rules 
that make use of this term. There is simply no reason to accept this view. One might reasonably 
conclude the rules are problematic or in need of refinement, but the implication that they should 
be rejected does not follow.  
I will grant that perhaps I am missing something important about when and why a rule’s 
terms need to be clearly defined. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that the DDR requires a precise 
definition of death. Under the Don’t Kill formulation at least, one is in need of a good 
understanding of life and the knowledge of how not to take it—not a precise definition of death. 
But what about the Death Requirement? Is is not the case that a precise definition of death is 
necessary to determine when we can safely remove vital organs? Surprisingly, the answer is no; 
a precise definition of death is not needed when individuals donate their  brains to science. No 
one worries about satisfying rigid death criteria when the brains of former football players are 
removed upon autopsy so that they can be studied for the purpose of diagnosing chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy (popularly known as CTE). Rather, the requirement is generated by 
procedures that intend to retrieve the healthiest organs possible for transplant and that accept the 
DDR as a constraint. Thus, it is the medical goals of organ transplantation in conjunction with 
the constraint of the Don’t Kill rule that require a precise definition of death. Yet many critics of 
the rule believe that either version of the DDR alone imposes this requirement. This is an 
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instance of a broader trend in the DDR literature, which I call “slanting” (for lack of a better 
term): attributing things we do not like to a single factor, while ignoring the relevance of other 
factors.  
Not about creating virtuous activity or good consequences 
A notable example of slanting comes from Frank Chaten [2], who asserts that the DDR has failed 
to perform its intended function, that is, to safeguard patient trust in the transplant enterprise. 
According to Chaten, compliance with the DDR “leads physicians to compromise many virtues 
essential to the excellent practice of medicine” [2, p. 496]. Abolishing the rule will remedy this 
situation, says Chaten, because it “will strengthen the doctor-patient relationship and foster 
trustworthiness in organ procurement” [2, p. 496]. Chaten’s critique is interesting in that it is not 
merely consequentialist; rather, he assumes the virtue ethics tradition as it is situated in medicine 
by Edmund Pellegrino [30]. The virtues at stake include: (a) fidelity to the patient’s best interests 
with respect to the desire to donate; (b) intellectual honesty with respect to the nature of death; 
(c) suppression of self-interest and the courage to support the good with respect to the difficulty 
of diagnosing death while simultaneously promoting the urgency of altruistic gifting; and lastly 
(d) compassionate care for the donor with respect to failure to administer general anesthesia to 
newly declared dead donors for precautionary reasons. Chaten’s consequentialist concern is that 
the application of the DDR at the bedside fails to bring about desirable states of affairs, that is, 
ones in which physicians accord with virtuous activity. Since transplant surgeons do not accord 
with these virtues, says Chaten, their activity undermines trust in the transplant system. To 
safeguard trust, then, we ought to reject the DDR. 
 Supposing for a moment that the primary purpose of the DDR is to safeguard trust (which 
it is not), Chaten’s argument fails to isolate the DDR from other relevant factors in cases where 
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the rule is applied so that the DDR can be properly blamed for undermining trust. For example, 
he believes the DDR disrespects donors by limiting their ability to donate healthy organs in cases 
where the donor does not die quickly enough. However, this problem arises only in donation-
after-circulatory-death (DCD) cases, not in brain death cases where the donor’s body is 
artificially ventilated. As for brain death cases, Chaten believes that the DDR sometimes forces 
physicians to impose brain death on donors and their families who for religious reasons may not 
agree that brain death is death. He cites an example in which he cared for a Muslim child whose 
parents rejected brain death, believing that death occurs when respiration expires. What goes 
unmentioned, however, is that these same parents would probably not allow their child to be 
killed on the operating table either. Hence, it is the medical and legal establishments’ 
commitment to brain death that creates a burden for cultural and religious values, not the DDR. 
As unfortunate as it may be when DCD donors fail to die quickly enough to donate healthy 
organs, it does not follow that the donor’s autonomy is disrespected if the acting transplant 
surgeon refuses to perform lethal surgery. Doctors are autonomous agents too, and by virtue of 
the respect they are due, they reserve the right to not intend the death of their patients—even in a 
world without the DDR. Then, perhaps it is worth examining whether our protocols fail to 
exemplify virtuous activity; maybe they, and not the DDR, are to blame for undermining trust in 
the transplant system.  
Chaten might reply that protocols like those currently used for DCD are the “offspring” 
of the DDR [2, p. 497]. If by this he means that such protocols are the product of a marriage 
between transplant medicine and the DDR, then so be it—this position is compatible with my 
claim that the DCD protocols in question may or may not be consistent with virtuous activity. In 
fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the transplant surgeons of the early 1960s were 
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uncomfortable with harvesting organs after circulatory death. Thomas Starzl remarked that the 
complicated maneuvering required to procure a healthy kidney after circulatory death led him 
and his colleagues to fear that they were violating the “spirit” of the “law”—that is, the law 
against homicide—even if they were following the “letter” of it [30, p. 149]. Should this 
discomfort not count as evidence that the DDR had a virtuous effect on early transplanters? After 
all, the rule’s spirit, if not its letter, revealed something important about the character of their 
actions, which led them to rethink their practices in order that they be able to treat the donor with 
greater respect. Chaten probably would not agree, however, because he sees the commitment of 
early transplant teams to the DDR as an “unexamined choice, not conceived by thoughtful 
analysis of alternatives or the result of wisdom obtained from the bedside” [2, p. 498]. As such, 
he claims that the rule was put forward merely as a pragmatic solution to the problems facing 
transplant surgery in the 1960s, and the pioneers of the discipline did not understand that they 
were creating the conditions for an imprudent medical practice. Is this true? I think not, and, as I 
argue in the next section, the acceptance of the DDR was the result of complying with not only 
the law against homicide but also traditional norms against killing patients for any reason, which 
were stringently reapplied after World War II. This context explains, in part, why Starzl and his 
colleagues thought they were not complying with the “spirit” of the law in the days before the 
legal recognition of brain death as death.  
Why did the early transplanters accept the DDR? 
Since the goal of organ transplantation is to replace an unhealthy organ with a healthy one, the 
body from which the healthy organ is taken must be in good enough shape to supply one. 
Assuming vital organ removal would bring about mortality, a dilemma emerges. Either we 
identify some condition of the donor, which is compatible with the donor’s being dead and 
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allows for the relevant organs to be healthy enough for transplant, and we remove organs only 
when that condition is reached, or we identify a level of health remaining in the donor, at which 
point lethal surgery is judged permissible, and we remove organs only when that level is reached. 
The dilemma pressures us either to precisely define death and reliably determine when it occurs 
or to revise our ethics of killing and precisely define the conditions under which a patient can be 
killed. In any case, something must be precisely defined if transplantation is to occur.  
When confronted with this dilemma in the 1960s, transplanters opted to “update” the 
definition of death to include neurological criteria alongside traditional cardiopulmonary criteria 
[32].15 This move is explained in part by the cultural upheavals of the time, which led some to 
advocate for the legalization of abortion and euthanasia [33, 34]. What kept the broader 
transplant community from becoming swept up into a more expansive view of physician-
permitted killing? At least some members were open to this development. Belding H. Scribner, a 
key innovator in dialysis treatment, said in his presidential address to the American Society of 
Artificial Internal Organs:  
As far as death is concerned, I would like to be able to put into my will a paragraph 
urging that when my physician felt that the end was near, I be put to sleep and any useful 
organs taken prior to death. I wonder how many people feel as I do? I think that ethical 
and legal guidelines should be devised to permit me and others to volunteer in these 
ways. [35, p. 211] 
 
I too wonder how many felt the same way as Scribner. As far as I know, the attitudes of early 
transplanters towards this question have not been empirically studied. Still, it should be asked: 
why did the transplant community lobby for a change in the definition of death rather than in 
                                                
15 Paul Ramsey’s survey of how this “updating” process went about presents the best summary of the relevant issues 
and events under consideration at the time [32].  
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homicide law? This question has three answers, each of which is explored in the next three 
subsections, respectively.  
The concern over human experimentation 
The first answer is found in the experimental nature of organ transplantation at the time. The 
startling long-term success of Joseph Murray and others in kidney transplantation highlighted the 
newfound awkward relationship between such practices and existing medical, legal, and 
theological norms [36, 37]. It was not clear to anyone at the time how the risks involved for both 
donor and recipient could be justified. Hence, the topic of human experimentation was front and 
center at the first symposium on transplant ethics held in London at the Ciba Foundation house 
(March 8-11, 1966). Starzl, who was invited to participate, reported that:  
The appropriate conditions for human experimentation was the foremost concern because 
the medical atrocities of World War II were still fresh in the collective mind. Three of the 
European participants (David Daube, Regius Professor of Law, Oxford; Hugh Edward de 
Wardener, nephrologist at Charing Cross Hospital; and Michael Woodruff, professor of 
surgery, Edinburgh) had experienced violations of their own human rights almost beyond 
description during years spent in concentration or prisoner-of-war camps. [31, p. 146]16  
 
The Nuremburg Code (1947) and the Helsinki Declaration (1964), both of which were index 
documents for the symposium, call for the uncompromised protection of the life and health of 
research subjects. Experiments involving a high risk of death or disabling injury to the subject 
are unacceptable according to these documents, even if the subject gives voluntary informed 
consent. This protection applied as much to the recipients as to the donors in the early days of 
transplantation. Murray, who performed the first successful kidney transplant between identical 
twins in 1954, saw with clarity that the practice of live kidney donation involved risking the 
                                                
16 In fact, Daube, who fled Germany in 1933, did not spend time in a camp, though his father did [38]. Woodruff and 
de Wardener spent time in the notorious Changi camp in Singapore. 
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health of a well person so that a sick person might be made well again [39]. Poor outcomes for 
the first few liver recipients in 1963 led Starzl and his team to impose a moratorium on the 
practice for more than three years [31, p. 105].  
Starzl’s ethical sensitivity is worth examining in detail. In a 1967 article [40], he claimed 
that the dominant tradition of medical ethics required physicians to provide their patients with 
the best care possible, no matter the circumstances. As he saw it, this viewpoint “placed the 
concept of the sanctity of human life on a practical foundation” and should not be abandoned “in 
the face of advancing technocracy” [40, p. 33]. At the Ciba symposium, he even questioned the 
practice of removing organs before the cessation of circulation on the basis of neurological 
criteria and contended that the surgeon and attending physician equally shared the responsibility 
to protect the lives of potential donors in hopelessly terminal states [41].17 At the time, he felt 
that the act of removing a kidney from the body of someone declared dead by neurological 
criteria constituted “an erosion of the historic medical creed of responsibility to the individual 
patient” [40, p. 36]. He even became uncomfortable with live donation as reports came in about 
donor manipulation and coercion, and in one case a donor’s death [31]. Although his views 
would change over time to accommodate what is now commonly practiced in transplantation, 
this transition was not without careful ethical reflection on whether or not longstanding 
principles of medical ethics were being honored.  
Beyond Starzl, participants at the Ciba symposium took the deontic constraints on lethal 
medical experimentation as given. When Michael Woodruff claimed that there were “obvious 
limitations” on living donors as organ suppliers, the reason he gave was this: “no one can donate 
                                                
17 Guy Alexandre’s neurological criteria for death, which he used in nine separate occasions, included “(1) complete 
bilateral mydriasis; (2) complete absence of reflexes, both nature and in response to profound pain; (3) complete 
absence of spontaneous respiration, five minutes after mechanical respiration has been stopped; (4) falling blood 
pressure necessitating increasing amounts of vasopressive drugs [...]; (5) a flat EEG” (quoted in [41, p. 69]).  
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his heart or liver and remain alive, and the same is true of a person who wants to donate a kidney 
if he happens to have only one which is functioning” [42, p. 10]. Looking ahead to heart 
transplants, George Schreiner curiously said,  
I personally would find considerable ethical objections to transplanting a heart, because 
no matter how certain the doctor is that he has to remove the recipient’s heart, he has in 
effect to kill the patient in order to do the experiment, whereas if he puts the heart in as an 
accessory organ at least he avoids this problem. [43, p. 132]18  
 
Even the Parisian physician Jean Hamburger, who thought medical practice should be given 
wide latitude in shaping ethical norms, was committed to a Kantian framework in which “an 
awareness of the value of human life” was essential to the training of virtuous doctors [44, p. 
138]. Echoing this sentiment, the Italian surgeon  Raffaello Cortesini claimed unequivocally that 
“the right to life of every individual must be respected up to the moment of death,” when laying 
out his ideas for proposed legislation in Italy regarding organ donation [45, p. 174]. On the 
matter of refusing to use children in transplant experiments, Daube was insistent: if by doing so, 
medical progress would be hampered, then “it is regrettable, but medical progress must then be 
hampered” [46, p. 199].  
The early transplant community accepted the norm against risky experimental surgery, 
and its members were concerned to make their newly devised protocols as safe as possible for 
both the donor and the recipient. The American Medical Association echoed this concern in its 
ethical guidelines for organ transplantation by including a clause calling for equal protection of 
both donor and recipient; in the Judicial Council’s view, no less than the “respect for the dignity 
of man” was at stake [47]. While the success of these efforts can be debated, the guidelines do 
offer an answer as to why transplanters did not advocate for a change in homicide law: 
                                                
18 It seems that Schreiner was committed to the odd view that life is essentially bound up with the presence of a 
beating heart rather than the presence of adequate circulation.  
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effectively killing donors for their organs involved lethal, and therefore forbidden, experimental 
surgery.  
The concern over homicide 
The second reason the transplant community advocated for a change in the definition of death 
rather than homicide law is that doctors did not see themselves as responsible for the deaths of 
the brain-damaged patients they disconnected from life support. The diagnosis of death became 
especially pertinent in circumstances involving homicide. The case of David Potter illustrates the 
problem well. In 1963, Potter suffered extensive brain trauma from a brawl and stopped 
breathing fourteen hours after being admitted to the hospital. He was subsequently connected to 
a ventilator so that one of his kidneys could be harvested for transplant. Twenty-four hours later, 
the kidney was removed and he was taken off life support; no spontaneous breathing resumed. 
The assailant who injured Potter was arrested and convicted of manslaughter by a jury, but his 
charges were later reduced to common assault, effectively absolving him of responsibility for 
Potter’s death [32]. The problem was that no one could agree on the moment when Potter died. 
The coroner thought that he was alive when the kidney was removed, the evidence being his 
spontaneous heartbeat. The physicians argued that the patient was “virtually dead” when he 
stopped breathing but “legally dead” when his heart stopped [32, p. 71]. A neurologist contended 
that Potter was dead before the kidney was removed due to the brain injury; a pathologist 
concurred and claimed that the removal of the kidney played no causal role in the patient’s death 
[48]. As a result, it was not clear who was responsible for Potter’s death. Was it the assailant or 
the physicians? While it may seem obvious to us today that responsibility lies with the assailant, 
the law of the day identified the presence of life with a beating heart. Under this view, it is less 
obvious that Potter’s death was caused by the actions of the assailant than by the actions of the 
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doctors. Indeed, a legal commenter at the time suggested that the termination of life support was 
the “immediate cause” of death, going on to generalize that “if S causes P’s death, a strong 
argument can be put up for saying that D, the original imposer of the wound, did not, and is not 
guilty of homicide” [49, p. 78].19 How this argument is supposed to go is not clear, but the point 
is that members of the medical profession—people who were trying to save Potter’s life—
became implicated in his death in ways that made little legal sense.20  
The Don’t Kill version of the DDR, then, was put in place because homicide law made 
physicians liable for the deaths of patients still alive at the time of transplant [50, 56–58]. 
Recognizing this, a legal scholar at the Ciba symposium counseled the following:  
In the present state of the law perhaps the only thing that one can be dogmatic about is 
that if life still continues in the conventional sense—e.g. if there is still a heart beat—then 
certainly any authorization [for transplant] from relatives is meaningless. The living 
person, however unconscious and unable to express his own opinion, has to be treated as 
a living person, and any authority from a relative would be meaningless. The problem 
therefore becomes one of defining the time of death for purposes of these removals. In 
the present state of the law I could only advise a client that he would incur the danger of a 
                                                
19 Miller and Truog, who ardently believe physicians cause the death of their patients when they remove life support 
from them [15], are, in a sense, modern-day witnesses for the defense in the trial of Potter’s assailant.  
20 Potter’s case was not unique. In May of 1968, Denton Cooley, a pioneering heart transplant surgeon from Texas, 
came under scrutiny after procuring a heart from a thirty-six-year-old welder named Clarence Nicks, who also 
suffered severe brain trauma from a brawl. The Harris County medical examiner worried that his autopsy 
investigation would be compromised if he were tasked with determining the cause of death in someone who no 
longer had a heart. While he eventually ruled that the cause of Nicks’ death was the massive brain injury, the legal 
definition of death was thought to be in conflict with the changing medical definition, providing the legal space for 
the defense to assert that it was Cooley, and not the brawlers, who were responsible for Nicks’ death [50, 51]. The 
conflict between medical examiners and transplanters came to a fever pitch when Stanford University’s Norman 
Shumway, another pioneering transplant surgeon, retrieved a heart from the body of a homicide victim without the 
examiner’s authorization. In this case, the defense attorneys succeeded in arguing that it was Shumway who killed 
the victim, rather than the victim’s assailant [52]. Similarly, in 1987, the assailant who shot Pamela James in the 
head had his murder charges dropped, since his defense attorney discovered in the coroner’s report that the time of 
James’ death coincided with the time that the transplant team removed her heart. To bolster his case, the defense 
attorney enlisted the aid of a neuropathologist, who determined James’ brain injury was of a “lower-grade” and did 
not preclude a chance at recovery. Since James was denied the chance of recovering, his client was not responsible 
for her death [53, 54]. In none of these cases was it ever suggested that homicide law should be changed to 
accommodate lethal surgery, since homicide law was relatively clear, while the definition of death was not. For 
better or for worse, two concepts of death were emerging, which had far-reaching implications for medical liability 
and organ transplantation: medical death, based on neurological or circulatory criteria, and legal death, based only 
on circulatory criteria. Doctors and lawyers struggled to articulate a unified definition of death that would 
adequately represent the physical facts, while serving the purposes of medicine and law [the best example comes 
from 55]. 
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possible charge of homicide if by removal of an organ he causes death, if life still 
continues in the conventional sense. (David Louisell, quoted in [41, p. 98]).  
 
Over time, the legal community came to accept brain death as death. It may very well be that 
defining death in terms of neurological criteria was merely a pragmatic solution to the legal 
problems faced by the transplant community. Enthusiasm for this solution was evident at both 
the Ciba meeting and the Cape Town Symposium (July 13–16, 1968), where protocols for heart 
transplants were discussed. Yet it is implausible that the DDR was part of this solution; if 
anything, the rule was part of the problem that needed solving, namely, how surgeons could 
avoid becoming implicated in the donor’s death.  
 It is important to acknowledge that individuals were identified whose only concern for 
the donor was to avoid transgressing the law or being charged with wrongdoing. In his memoirs, 
Murray recalls that those who attended the International Conference on Human Kidney 
Transplants in 1963 were “mostly young, aggressive, and ambitious doctors” that eagerly wanted 
to move forward “unfettered whatever the cost” [59, p. 118]. He even remembers certain doctors 
saying, “I’m not going to wait for the medical examiner to declare the patient dead; I’m just 
going to take the organ” [59, p. 120]. Taking on the role of “a mother hen,” Murray urged a 
“cautious optimism” that would result in “slow and steady progress”—the “entrepreneurial zeal 
for rapid progress” of the young attendants had to be reined in so that their experimental 
practices would not fall into disrepute [59, p. 118–119]. Perhaps, then, the early transplanters 
were merely being ‘prudential but not moral’ with the ethics of their discipline.   
Worries about breaking the law do not fully explain the early transplant community’s 
commitment to the DDR, however. There still remains the fact that no one lobbied for a change 
in homicide law, or at least an exception to it, something that should have been a live option if 
medical pragmatism ruled the day. Norman Fost is correct when he says, “If immunity was what 
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was sought, or assurance that there would be no liability for discontinuing life support or 
removing organs from a brain-dead patient, there were and are ways of achieving immunity from 
liability” [60, p. 722]. Statutes could have been rewritten to avoid violating the law, or new 
statutes could have been created to grant immunity to physicians who operate on brain-dead 
patients. What explains the community’s reluctance to lobby for these changes is that many 
transplanters were concerned with upholding the time-honored norm against medical killing, 
which, as they saw it, flowed from a general respect for the value of human life even in its 
diminished state. They recognized that homicide law as well as the recent formulations of the 
Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki was based on something more fundamental, 
namely, the intrinsic worth of the human being. This is the third and final reason that a change in 
the definition of death was preferred over a change in the law.  
The intrinsic worth of the human being 
The contribution of Swedish urologist Gustav Giertz to the 1966 Ciba meeting is of particular 
interest, since he recognizes the conflict between the traditional inviolability-of-human-life 
doctrine and the expansion of legal killing in the medical context [61]. Commenting on the 
situation in Sweden after the legalization of abortion in 1963, Giertz saw his country 
approaching a turning point where the hegemony of Christian belief was yielding to a new 
uncertainty about the ultimate foundations of morality. Despite the changing times, he observed 
that “there is one norm, however, to which everyone seems to adhere, namely, the worth of the 
human being” [61, p. 140]. “The inviolateness of human life,” according to Giertz, “is based on 
the belief that every human life, even the most wretched, has a meaning” [61, p. 140]. This belief 
maintains its grip not because its countenance is rational in a secular context (indeed, he thinks it 
is not), but because we fear that without it, “respect for the value of the human being and hence 
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democracy is in danger” [61, p. 140]. The acceptance of abortion, which in his view terminates a 
human life at an early stage and deprives someone of the chance to live a long, beneficial life, 
lends credence to the morality of euthanasia, which presumably terminates a human life at a late 
stage and only deprives someone of a short life filled with misery. In either case, Giertz says we 
are forced to face the questions of “whether we can establish the moment when life ceases to 
have any human value” and whether we can draw a boundary that permits us to “disregard the 
obligation to protect life” [61, p. 140]. After sensitively considering all of these points, even 
under the auspices of voluntary informed consent, Geirtz concludes,  
It cannot be considered consistent with good medical ethics to use a moribund person as a 
donor, for he has no possibility of giving his permission or exercising his freedom of 
choice. Moreover the procedure is in conflict with the widely accepted rule of medical 
etiquette that personal integrity must be respected. A person dying is still a person living, 
and he keeps his elementary human rights up to the moment when life becomes extinct. 
[61, p. 147]21 
  
Thus, it seems that besides a concern for abiding by laws against homicide, there was a strong 
commitment to respecting the value and integrity of human life, a commitment that was probably 
a vestige of the Judeo-Christian value system that still haunts our post-Christian culture today.22 
                                                
21 To be sure, when pressed about whether one could consent by an advanced directive to donate one’s organs only 
if one was in a state of irreversible unconsciousness, Giertz replied, “I think it would be better if we were able to 
take organs from living persons while they are unconscious, but with their previous permission” (quoted in [41, p. 
155]). Later, however, he qualified his claim, saying that he was thinking of the kidneys only, not organs like the 
heart. These remarks were in reference to a Stockholm case where a brain-damaged patient had a single kidney 
removed and then was taken off a respirator twenty-four hours later. As stated, his remarks are ambiguous, since 
they occur in a context about the validity of Alexandre’s tests for brain death and whether brain-death is equivalent 
or not to death. There is no evidence to suggest that Geirtz had “higher-brain death” in mind, as if irreparable 
damage to one’s cerebrum were sufficient for death. In fact, Geirtz is aware of such an idea and deems it to be an 
unacceptable gerrymandering of death; he says such a view would leave the “biological and medical frame of 
reference” [61, p. 148]. Thus, it appears that he endorsed something like Morrisey’s previously mentioned protocol 
over Alexandre’s brain-death-based protocol because he did not agree with Alexandre that the brain-damaged 
patient was nothing more than “heart-lung preparations”—a description that originates from the dissection 
laboratory rather than the hospital bedside [62, p. 149]. 
22 Evidence for the view that the law against homicide is an artifact of the belief that life is sacred is found in the 
legal history outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), which ruled against the 
constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide. 
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This quasi-religiously informed respect for life had another application, which is all but 
forgotten in the DDR literature today: the total well-being of the patient could not be reduced for 
a medical purpose that did not in some way benefit the patient. The pedigree of this concern for 
the total well-being of the donor stretches back to the 1600s, when surgeons were experimenting 
with tooth transplantation. In 1685, Charles Allen complained that the use of human teeth from 
the living entailed ruining the health of the one to restore the health of the other. As he wryly 
observed, “it is only robbing of Peter to pay Paul” (quoted in [63, p. 47]) This same concern was 
raised by Joseph Fox in 1803, a time when tooth transplant was losing popularity. He wrote, 
“this operation involved in it a defect of the moral principle, as one person is injured and 
disfigured, in order to contribute to the luxury and convenience of another” (quoted in [63, p. 
48]). Even as late as 1966, Italian transplanters were limited by a 1940 Civil Code that prohibited 
the removal of any part of the body that would irrecoverably diminish the health and integrity of 
the body [45, p. 172]. The recognition of this norm helps explain why both France and Italy, at 
the time of the Ciba meeting, had banned the removal of a single kidney from a living patient. 
Not even operations like Murray’s transplant between identical twins were legal in those 
countries, which is why Murray grasped for arguments appealing to the avoidance of “psychic 
trauma”—which would result from losing a loved one if one were prohibited from donating—to 
show that the donor’s total well-being was not necessarily reduced [64].  
Given these ethical commitments, it is only natural that the early transplant community 
became interested in a more precise definition of death. This is especially evident at the more 
cautious Ciba meeting, which focused mostly on renal transplants, and the more ambitious Cape 
Town Symposium, which focused exclusively on heart transplants. Reading through the minutes 
of both meetings shows that the skepticism of diagnosing death by neurological criteria greatly 
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decreased in the time that elapsed between them. It is often claimed by “conservative” and 
“liberal” critics alike that adoption of the neurological criteria for death outlined by the Harvard 
Ad Hoc Committee [65] was primarily motivated by a concern for maximizing the supply of 
potential organ donors [4, 66–69]. While disputes over the motives and methods of Henry 
Beecher and his colleagues are complex and ongoing [62, 70], everyone acknowledged that, if 
valid, neurological criteria afforded the perfect opportunity to remove healthy organs at the 
nearest point after the time of death.  
While it may be true that by twenty-first-century standards, a sizable portion of the 
population is willing to permit vital organ procurement from those who are alive but permanently 
unconscious [71], we should not forget that these judgments are made with the knowledge that 
organ transplantation is a medically successful enterprise. Of course, this luxury was not 
available in the 1950s and ’60s, when the first transplants were attempted. We have this 
knowledge because we came to agree through the efforts of clinicians, lawyers, philosophers, 
theologians, and legislators that “total brain failure” signifies death [72].  
It is unlikely that our progress in transplant science could have advanced as quickly as it 
did without the ventilator-dependent, brain-dead donor, whose functioning circulatory system 
kept transplantable organs bathed in oxygenated blood. Nonetheless, the progress of 
transplantation has had the ironic effect of eroding support for the DDR. I examine the reasons 
for this decline in support in the next section.  
Arguments against the DDR 
Despite the fact that neurological criteria are widely considered suitable for diagnosing death, 
two arguments against both versions of the DDR emerged from scrutinizing the motivations that 
the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee [65] gave for adopting neurological criteria in the first place—
TMBE 17-019-R1 Copyedits  Omelianchuk 25 / 37 
 
 
specifically, the justification they offered for removing life support from hopelessly unconscious 
patients and the opportunity they afforded to retrieve healthy organs from these patients. The 
first argument goes like this:  
1.   If it is true that doctors should not cause the death of their patients (i.e. kill them) for any 
reason, then withdrawing life-sustaining treatment upon patient request is impermissible.  
2.   But it is not impermissible.  
3.   Therefore, it is false that doctors should not cause the death of their patients for any 
reason.  
 
This latest iteration of James Rachels’ “bare difference” argument [74, 75] is defended by Miller, 
Truog, and Daniel Brock [15, See also 23, 25, 76]. While Miller and Truog acknowledge that 
there is a structural difference between active euthanasia and withdrawing life support insofar as 
the latter can be grounded in the common law right to bodily integrity and the former cannot [15, 
p. 29–30], they deny that any morally relevant difference in the doctor’s action depends on the 
underlying pathology of the patient or on whether withdrawing life support is an “omission” [15, 
ch. 1] or the death of the patient is a foreseen but unintended side effect of withdrawing life 
support. Although this argument does not directly rebut the DDR, it undercuts its ethical 
foundation, that is, the norm against killing patients for any reason. If to withdraw life support is 
to kill, and doing so is permissible on the grounds of poor quality of life and patient autonomy, 
then the traditional rationale for the DDR fails [74, 75]. Not surprisingly, this argument is 
attractive to those who support voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide—it is 
likewise rejected by those who do not [15, 79].  
The second brain death-related argument against the DDR can be summarized like this:  
1.   If it is wrong to kill the donor, then it is impermissible to retrieve vital organs from brain-
dead donors. 
2.   But it is permissible.  
3.   Therefore, it is not wrong to kill the donor. 
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The soundness of this argument, defended by Truog and many others, obviously depends on the 
claim that brain-dead donors are not really dead [4, 15, 23, 26, 80–82]. Evidence adduced for this 
claim is that brain-dead bodies are warm to the touch, regulate temperature, heal wounds, fight 
infection, expel waste, and in some cases even gestate a fetus. Interestingly, however, the ablest 
defender of this claim and the scholar cited by every brain death critic, D. Alan Shewmon [83–
85], does not agree that it is permissible to retrieve organs from brain-dead donors. To do so, in 
his view, would be to harm the donor. Further, Shewmon believes that the view of harm assumed 
by the likes of Miller and Truog is inadequate because it is “Cartesian” in character [86, p. 
292].23 The reason that so few follow Shewmon on this point is that the shortage in the organ 
supply is deemed “deplorable” [90, p. 38], and any limitation on organ procurement would be 
“drastic” [15, p. 146] and ‘needless’ [91, p. 320], signifing a “devotion to symbols ahead of the 
real interest dying patients have in transplantation” [77, p. 272].24  
A similar argument against the DDR emerged for the same reasons from the dispute over 
the DCD procedures that allow transplant surgery to begin two to five minutes after the time of 
asystole [19]. In the case of heart transplants, there is an alleged incompatibility between the act 
of harvesting a healthy heart from a “non-heart-beating donor” and the act of declaring death on 
the basis of circulatory criteria [92, 93]. Thus, the argument against the DDR can be summarized 
like so:  
1.   If it is wrong to kill the donor, then it is impermissible to retrieve vital organs from non-
heart-beating donors. 
2.   But it is permissible.  
                                                
23 Robert Veatch likewise rejects the soundness of this argument, though he accepts premise (2), and rejects premise 
(1), because in his view we can be considered dead only if we irreversibly lose our “higher” brain capacities for 
conscious experience [87, 88]. Even the famed euthanasia advocate Rachels agrees, since in his view it is 
appropriate to fix “the time of death at the point at which consciousness is no longer possible” [75, p. 43]. Still 
others defend the idea that brain death is equivalent to death and that we should comply with the DDR [72, 89]. 
24 The idea that there might be a deeper concern about what those symbols signify and whether to have an interest in 
transplantation is to have an interest in a lethal enterprise is not seriously considered. 
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3.   Therefore, it is not wrong to kill the donor. 
 
The soundness of this argument has been defended by Don Marquis and others on the grounds 
that irreversibility, which is thought to be a necessary condition for death, is not satisfied [15, 77, 
94, 95]. Although some critics of the argument appeal to higher-brain criteria that render premise 
(1) false [91], others reject premise (2) and demand that the non-heart-beating protocol be 
revised, if not rejected [96, 97]. Yet few of those who believe DCD donors are alive at the time 
of surgery believe that “a procedure that saves many lives ought to be halted” [94, p. 30].25 
These arguments find their persuasiveness in the fact that no substantial change in any of 
our widely accepted practices is required to accommodate their conclusions. We would only 
need to change the ethical justification for these practices and implement better guidelines for 
informed consent. The motivation for doing this would be to circumvent longstanding ethical 
norms that would render transplant surgery (and withdrawing life support) impermissible. As 
Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu say, “The cost of preserving those norms will be the 
death or ongoing morbidity of many individuals,” that is, those in need of a healthy organ, and 
“this may prompt us to consider whether those principles should be revised or rejected” [99, p. 
33]. Similarly, Miller and Truog explain:  
Honestly facing the situation of vital organ donation poses a critical ethical choice. In 
order to honor the dead donor rule we can give up vital organ procurement, with the 
drastic consequence that many patients whose lives could be saved by organ 
transplantation will die. Alternatively, we can abandon the dead donor rule and justify 
vital organ transplantation on different grounds. [100, p. 11] 
 
                                                
25 Other critics deny premise (1): Tom Tomlinson [98] and John Robertson [8] think the concept of “irreversibility” 
can be satisfied if we include the donor’s do-not-resuscitate order within its scope, which would make any attempt to 
revive the donor after asystole impermissible. In this view, the modality of impermissibility is thought to be strong 
enough to satisfy the “irreversibility” condition even if there is a patient in the next room who is in the same 
physical condition as the donor but wants to be and is able to be revived. Still, others appeal to higher-brain criteria 
that render premise (1) false [93]. 
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Hence, critics of the DDR would have us tailor our ethical theories concerning the wrongness of 
killing to fit our current practices, a pattern of thought that reverses the thinking behind the 
transplant ethics stemming from the 1960s, in which practice was tailored to fit with ethics.  
Answering the details of the critic’s arguments is another project, but for now I want to 
note only that, even if we grant the (controversial) first premise in these argument, they each still 
beg the question against the historic rationale for the DDR, that is, that we ought not to intend the 
death of an innocent human being. Critics justify the second premise in each argument with what 
I call the Disjunctive Theory of the wrongness of killing. According to this theory, it is 
permissible to kill someone, S, if (1) S is not (or is only minimally) harmed by death, and (2) S 
gives valid consent to be killed by some humane means; it is wrong to kill S if one or the other of 
these conditions is unsatisfied. Yet this theory is precisely what is under dispute, so it cannot be 
used as a premise for an argument showing that the DDR ought to be rejected. A good example 
of this question-begging tactic is deployed by David Rodríguez-Arias, Maxwell Smith, and Neil 
Lazer in their defense of lethal transplant surgery when they appeal to the moral relevance of 
informed consent, which to their minds is “the main moral condition justifying voluntary 
euthanasia” [9, p. 41]. Yet voluntary euthanasia is prohibited for the same reason as lethal 
transplant surgery according to the rationale for the DDR: the death of an innocent human being 
should never be intended (and death need not be intended in the case of withdrawing life support 
[see 101, 102 for details]).  
Perhaps, though, the broader strategy of critics is to present a kind of reductio ad 
absurdum argument against the DDR: if the rationale behind the DDR is true, then transplant 
surgery is immoral; but it is not immoral, so the rationale is false and the Disjunctive Theory is 
rendered plausible. However, this argument form is not a reductio; rather, it is a modus tollens. 
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There is simply no formal contradiction involved unless one just assumes that lethal transplant 
surgery or intending death by withdrawing life support is permissible, but that assumption is 
precisely under dispute. Even critics like Miller and Truog acknowledge that accepting the 
implication that transplant surgery, as it is currently practiced, ought to be halted is rational, 
despite the “drastic” outcomes it has [15, p. 146]. No doubt this implication is hard to accept. But 
the Disjunctive Theory has implications that are hard to accept too, since it allows for the 
permissibility of lethal medical experimentation. Are advocates of lethal transplant surgery 
willing to go this far? If not, why not? If the answer is because the benefits from doing so are not 
likely to follow or are too remote, then we should admit that what motivates the adoption of the 
Disjunctive Theory is some form of consequentialism that only adheres to the practice of 
informed consent because of the good outcomes it produces, not because it is the right thing to 
do.   
A commitment to doing the right thing should compel those (like me) who accept the 
longstanding rationale behind the DDR to call for, or at least be willing to call for, a restraint on 
our zeal to perpetuate life through organ transplant (e.g. [103, 104]). That is, we should be 
willing to bite the bullet and curtail the practices of organ transplantation if the case against our 
current practices succeeds.26 Yet risking this unsavory outcome is not unique to this position, 
since the majority of donors consistently indicate that they are willing to donate only if they are 
dead [102].27 If the critics have their way, vital organ transplant will become a deeply divisive 
                                                
26 It should be noted that I think neither the case for equating withdrawing life support with killing nor the case 
against declaring death on the basis of total brain failure succeeds at all (see [17, 105–107] for some recent 
scholarship on these issues). I am currently agnostic about our DCD protocols, however. Another paper for another 
time.   
27 To be sure, how death is defined is crucial in that there is some support for donating organs when one criterion for 
“higher-brain” death is satisfied. Be that as it may, James DuBois and Emily Anderson report, “69% agreed that they 
would only allow donation after the patient was taken off the ventilator and his or her heart stopped beating, which 
would require use of a DCD protocol and reduce the number of procurable organs” [108, p. 69].   
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practice, much like abortion or euthanasia, insofar as it will require physicians to kill in order to 
achieve their beneficent goals. While Miller and Truog are optimistic that public support for 
organ donation would not change for the worse if their policy recommendations were 
implemented, they are willing to risk a net loss in the supply of organs for the sake of being 
honest with the public [3, 103]. On this point, at least, they agree that medical practice ought to 
follow sound moral principles even if they have negative effects on the organ supply, an 
admirable quality that other critics should imitate.  
Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this paper, the DDR is not well defined, and its purpose is sometimes poorly 
understood. I have argued that its essential moral core is the Don’t Kill rule and not the Death 
Requirement. Historically speaking, the DDR was (and still is) accepted out of an effort to 
comply with the law against homicide and the traditional medical norm against killing patients 
for any reason. Respect for the inviolability and dignity of innocent human life, even at its 
margins, was (and should be) the underlying concern, though it is unclear whether this is still the 
case. As organ transplantation has become a routine and commonly prescribed treatment, 
discontent with the rule has arisen alongside a growing dissatisfaction with our currently 
accepted death criteria as well as an increasing willingness to kill patients on the basis of their 
autonomous choice or their poor quality of life (or both). What we see today is the opposite of 
what we saw in the 1960s: the tendency to rethink our laws and ethical theories concerning the 
wrongness of killing to befit our common medical practices. This should not be the case. Starzl’s 
advice is as timely now as it was then: longstanding ethics recognizing the inviolateness of 
human life, which require physicians to provide the best care possible to their patients no matter 
the circumstances, should not be abandoned just because our “advancing technocracy” has made 
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great progress. What is needed is less debate about death criteria and (per usual) more consistent, 
noncircular discussion around the question of what makes killing wrong.28 While this question is 
well worn and much discussed, a broader public consensus is needed on its answer to move the 
debate forward.  
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